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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON MANG6177W1
SEMESTER 1 EXAMINATIONS 2022-23
MANG6177 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
DURATION: 2 (TWO) HOURS
This paper contains FIVE questions.
Answer TWO questions in total.
All questions carry equal marks.
If you attempt more questions than required, only the required
number of answers will be marked. Please strike through any
answers that you do not wish to be marked. If you do not do this the
marker will mark the answers in the order that they appear in your
exam paper.
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A foreign language direct ‘Word to Word’ translation dictionary
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additions or annotations.
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1. What influences have shaped international developments in strike activity since the
1970s
Introduce strike activity and its relationship to other forms of industrial action,
possibly with some reference to van Wanrooy et al (2013) for example.
Comment briefly on how it relates conceptually to fundamental themes of
employee relations (e.g. essential conflicts, distinct and contradictory vs.
common interests, pluralist and radical views vs. unitarism), perhaps with
reference to Blyton and Turnbull (2004) for example.
Outline trends in strike activity, particularly by volume (working days lost,
preferably relative to the size of the workforce), to give a sense of general
developments, with a particular (though not at all necessarily exclusive) focus
on the old industrialized world or OECD, where there has been a ubiquitous
fall from the 1970s. Perhaps some consideration of enduring differences
between strike volume within the old industrialised group in particular.
Scheuer (2006) is a key reference regarding the old industrialized world at
least, but there may be consideration of developments in newly industrialised,
or otherwise developing, countries. Perhaps some reference to Vernon (2006).
Discuss alternative views of what shapes strike activity (e.g. psychological
theories of grievance and attribution, union power, structure and significance
of joint regulation/collective bargaining, labour law, unemployment, product
market competition, globalization, shifting sectoral composition,
individualization of culture, individuals attitudes to and expectations of
collective action) and consider the account which these can offer of strike
developments, particularly across the old industrialized world as a whole, but
also with some reference to enduring differences within the old industrialized
world and indeed perhaps also to experience in the newly industrialized world.
Scheuer (2006), Godard (2011) and Vernon (2006) are key references, perhaps
reference also to Brandl & Traxler (2010), Piazza (2005).
Some assessment of whether an individualisation of (or in) culture, or
declining faith in the legitimacy or efficacy of strike activity, has meant that
conflict is expressed in new ways – especially absenteeism, voluntary quits and
industrial tribunal claims – in the old industrialized world. Key references e.g.
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Kersley et al (2006), but use might also be made of work by Sapsford and
Turnbull (1994; 1996) – at least indirectly via Tanguy (2013) – Tanguy (2013)
himself on union presence and employment tribunals, Godard (2011) and
perhaps even Hyman (1972) or indeed other sources in organizational
behaviour/work psychology.
Conclude critically on the evidence available.
2. Does the comparative historical experience of Britain and Sweden suggest that it is
economic influences which are crucial to the centralisation of joint regulation
Define joint regulation, perhaps with some contrast to collective bargaining,
and highlight the actors involved
Define the centralization of joint regulation, with reference to the highest
(most aggregate) level at which joint regulation occurs and to the balance of
bargaining activity across the levels at which it occurs
Outline the logic of the argument of Ingham (1974) that the greater
centralization of joint regulation in Sweden vs. the UK in the 1970s was a
result of the greater centralization of Swedish employers on industrialization,
that this itself was a result of the greater ease of cooperation amongst Swedish
employers given industrial concentration and specialization, and that at the
base of all lay Sweden’s relatively late industrialization (given small domestic
market and trade openness). These are matters of economic history,
concerning economic influences.
Consider (perhaps with explicit reference to Fulcher 1988; 1991) the problems
with this argument, e.g. the lack of evidence that Swedish industrial
concentration was greater in the crucial formative period of industrialization.
Perhaps some very brief reference to the Danish experience (which shows
very clearly that centralized employers’ association can develop with
extremely low industrial concentration) but this is really beyond the scope of
the specific question!
Consider the notion that economic conditions immediately shaped the
structure and character of unionism, as considered by Fulcher. These are also
matters of economic history, concerning economic influences.
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Consider the possibility discussed by Fulcher that political conditions in terms
of the activity of the state shaped employer organization in the two countries.
Consider Fulcher’s argument, which centres on the contrast between
developments in Sweden and the UK, that the historic ‘labour challenge’
(particularly around the period of industrialization) was crucial to the
comparative situation of the 1970s, and itself hinges on the power and
coherence of unions, and thus on ideology and political conditions in this
sense. Perhaps some reference to the timing of industrialisation relative to the
availability of a class unifying ideology, i.e. socialist ideas.
Consider the relevance of economic influences (international pressure to be
high productivity/to be competitive) to developments in the centralization of
joint regulation in the UK and Sweden 1970s-2000s, a period of rapid
economic internationalization or ‘globalization’. Key references here e.g.
Claydon (1989), Machin (2000), Dolvik & Marginson (2018), Katz (1993),
Ulfsdotter Eriksson et al (2021), Vernon (2006). With regard to the UK
perhaps note the centrality of political interpretation of the national economic
situation by Thatcher to the British experience.
Ultimately, conclude critically but in a manner which stresses the significance
not so much of economics but rather of ideology and politics both in the
formation of the systems in e.g. Sweden and UK which prevailed in the 1970s
and also in developments since. Perhaps some reference to path dependency.
Perhaps some brief and well-justified mention of experiences in other
countries merely as an aside in the conclusion.
3. Do countries which have comparatively stronger joint regulation generally tend to
have comparatively weaker direct statutory regulation of the employment relationship
Define national systems of employee relations with reference to pattern of
collective bargaining (and perhaps also strike activity) and to the framework
of labour and employment law (i.e. statutory provision of employee
participation through works councils/board representation also contributing to
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joint regulation and the distinct direct regulation of individual employment
relationship via statutory minimum wage, individual empl
oyment protection
legislation, statutory regulation of working time etc). Perhaps some reference
to Blyton and Turnbull (2004).
Profile in some detail the current employee relations systems of a number of
countries evaluating the significance of joint regulation and of legal or
statutory regulation, with appropriate reference to the position of statutory
works councils/board representation, which constitute a means of joint
regulation but not direct statutory regulation. Focus mainly on the old
industrialised world or OECD, but not necessarily exclusively. Key references
Vernon (2006), Dolvik & Marginson (2018), Andersen and Mailand (2005),
but perhaps also reference to the Jelle Visser database, Immervoll (2007),
Bassanini et al (2008/9), and for Germany particularly Addison et al (2016),
Addison et al (2017) and Mueller and Stegmaier (2017) allied perhaps to
Turner (1991) or Streeck (1992), and perhaps on Norway Barth et al (2020).
Consider whether this evidence suggests that the two elements of employee
relations systems distinguished in the question are indeed substitutes in the
manner the question suggests (or perhaps in contrast if the argument is set up
appropriately complements/co-variates!). Perhaps reference to the logic of
functional equivalents (or equivalence) with regard to the social regulation of
work, or – relatedly – the idea that there is a constant sum of social regulation
always fulfilled.
Perhaps some reference to where (if anywhere) welfare states fit in all this.
Conclude critically, almost certainly that if there is any such tendency to such
substitution it is extremely weak. It can only be argued as strong if attention is
confined to a very particular range of aspects of the employee relations system
and/or to strategically selected countries.
4. Does stronger joint regulation promote better people management and productivity
performance
Define joint regulation briefly, with reference to unionism and works councils.
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Perhaps some initial theoretical discussion of possibilities before contemplation of
empirical evidence.
Consider what constitutes stronger joint regulation – it may be derived from differing
mixes of activity at different levels. Inevitably though it involves a containment of
managerial prerogative in certain (though varying) respects by union or works council
activity (there might also be some reference to employee board representation). Key
references are Vernon (2006), for Germany specifically Addison et al (2016) and
Mueller and Stegmaier (2017), and generally also possibly perhaps Kersley et al
(2006), Blyton and Turnbull (2004) or van Wanrooy et al (2013).
Consider the implications for people management and managers of unionism and joint
regulation involving near continuous opportunistic workplace negotiation. Reference
to the experience in the old industrialized world, e.g. that in the UK, drawing perhaps
on Gregg et al (1993) but most likely Vernon and Rogers (2013). Possible reference
also to newly industrialised/developing countries.
Outline the more typical implications for people managements and managers of
unionism and joint regulation in terms of the establishment or maintenance of the
bureaucracy of an internal labour market as conceived for example by Clark (1980) or
perhaps Osterman (1987) (i.e. job classification rules, wage rules, job security rules
(grievance and disciplinary), career rules) on the US or perhaps Turner (1991) or
Streeck (1992) on Germany. Perhaps note the implications for compression or
structuring of pay structures (e.g. Vernon, 2011; Vernon and Rogers, 2013).
Reference to the national experience of e.g. Germany or Sweden.
Evaluate how far joint regulation’s institutionalization of conflict thus offers a useful
structure and legitimacy in people management decisions and implementation, ideally
with reference to the predominant structure, ideology, identity or approach of unions
(again perhaps with reference to Vernon and Rogers, 2013).
Discuss in detail how the impact of joint regulation on productivity is contingent,
hinging upon the predominant structures and traditions of unionism, drawing in
particular on Vernon and Rogers (2013), but also making use of Mueller and
Stegmaier (2017) on Germany and perhaps also referring to Barth et al (2020) and
Svarstad & Kostol (2022ev) on Norway.
Consider the relationship between the evidence on the implications of stronger joint
regulation for management and that on the implications of stronger joint regulation for
productivity performance.
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Conclude critically, perhaps with attention to hitherto rather neglected countries of the
newly industrialised or developing world.
5. Do formal partnership agreements ensure that management-union partnerships deliver
improved organisational performance
Begin by introducing the notion of management-union partnership and the focus on
management action in response to union presence it implies.
Discuss the various meanings of partnership (drawing e.g. on Guest and Peccei (2001)
and Bryson et al (2005)), contrasting in particular formal agreements with
partnerships of some real meaning or substance, and/or (relatedly) contrasting
‘sweetheart’ deals with meaningful commitments to reform work through and
alongside developing representative participation/employee voice (the key reference
here is Boxall and Purcell (e.g. 2003)).
Consider what might be meant by ‘performance’, probably but not necessarily
focusing on productivity as a shared/common interest outcome.
Note at least briefly that if the eradication of the union is not possible then the
benchmark for all reflection involves a continuing union, so that any benefits of
partnership must be benchmarked against non-partnership in this context.
Consider the possible advantages to management of integrating unions in
development or work reform projects, including issues of the uncertainties of
management over the details of reform desired, the potential of an excluded union to
resist change, the role of unions in legitimating change and in easing practical
implementation etc.
Consider to what extent formal partnership per se is consequential, how prospects
may depend on the orientation of the local union and the approach of local
management, and also the apparent relevance to performance of partnership of mutual
acknowledgement and respect, and of joint commitment to need for reform (key
reference here is Guest and Peccei, 2001). In this context consider how the broad
ideological conditions and statutory arrangements characterizing a country are
relevant to prospects via their influence on the orientations of unions and
managements. This may be considered with reference to specific countries, perhaps
but not necessarily within the established OECD.
Consider the evidence (particularly Bryson et al, 2005; perhaps also Black and Lynch,
2001 and Zwick) that unions+work reform (/high commitment management/high
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involvement management) equal improved productivity performance, regardless of
the orientations of the actors or whether there is a formal partnership agreement or not.
Consider the possibility that this may reflect the superior performance delivered by
work reform alongside job security and even indeed internal labour markets (as
against formal partnership agreements).
Conclude appropriately sceptically with regard to whether better performance is
ensured.
END OF PAPER
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